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INTRODUCTION
It is estimated that sixty-eight percent of adults in the United States
own and use a smartphone.1 These devices have brought with them incredible
efficiency and convenience, but those benefits are not without new
complications. Seemingly ever more at the forefront of both political and

*
Ryan Russell is a former music industry professional pursuing his Juris Doctor at
Belmont University College of Law. He received his B.B.A. from Belmont University with
a major in Music Business. Ryan and his wife, Susan, are members of Fellowship Bible
Church in Brentwood, TN. They live in Nashville, where they enjoy camping, hiking, and
pretty much anything else involving the outdoors.
1. Monica Anderson, Technology Device Ownership: 2015, PEW RES. CTR. (Oct. 29,
2015), http://www.pewinternet.org/2015/10/29/technology-device-ownership-2015/.

311

312

BELMONT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 5: 311

technological debate is the concern of individual privacy, and the extent to
which the government may intrude upon that privacy.
A novel legal question has been sparked by the existence of an
emergency function (“Emergency”) built into smartphones which allows a
person, without knowing or contravening the phone’s passcode, to make a
call to any number. The Emergency button shows on the phone’s lock screen
and, when pressed, provides access, not only to a user’s pre-loaded Medical
ID information, but also to a dialing screen to be used for calling 911. The
primary purpose of Emergency is safety—should a smartphone’s user be
incapacitated for any reason, a bystander can pick up that person’s phone and
get in touch with emergency services, regardless of whether the user locks
their phone with a passcode.
While there are many obvious safety benefits to this technology, the
ability to dial out from the phone in this way raises new legal issues.
Particularly, would police use of the Emergency function on a lawfullyseized smartphone qualify as a search for purposes of the Fourth
Amendment? Should officers be required to secure a warrant before being
able to use the functionality in pursuit of a criminal suspect?
This issue was recently raised in a California court during a criminal
case against Matthew Muller, who was on trial for burglarizing a home. 2
Allegedly, Muller was stealing from the home when he was confronted by
the homeowner and fled, but not before dropping his iPhone.3 Police
recovered the phone and used the Emergency function to call 911—
inherently giving the number associated with the phone to the 911 operator.4
Officers got the phone number from 911 and determined the service
provider.5 At this point, they obtained a warrant, allowing police to get
Muller’s identification from the provider.6
At trial, Muller argued that the evidence obtained from the phone
should be excluded because police use of the Emergency function was an
illegal search.7 Ultimately, this issue was not decided. The judge determined
that the phone in this particular case was abandoned property, and therefore
Muller had no privacy interest in it.8 The question remains as to whether this

2. Orin Kerr, Applying the Fourth Amendment to Placing Calls from a Locked Phone
to Identify its Owner, THE VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (June 22, 2016), https://www.
washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2016/06/22/applying-the-fourthamendment-to-placing-calls-from-a-locked-phone-to-identify-its-owner/?utm_term
=.6746bfbc9851.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Rina Nakano, Judge Rules Cell Phone Will Remain as Evidence in Kidnapping
Case Against Matthew Muller, FOX 40 (June 23, 2016, 4:22 PM), http://fox40.com/2016/
06/23/judge-rules-cell-phone-will-remain-as-evidence-in-kidnapping-case-against-matthewmuller/.
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could constitute a search under the Fourth Amendment under a different set
of circumstances, however.
In determining whether an officer’s use of the Emergency function
of a phone is a search, it is important first to lay a foundation for why the
Constitution provides protection against searches in the first place. Part I of
this Note will provide a brief overview of why the Fourth Amendment was
adopted, and what rights it is intended to protect. Next, it is impossible to
know whether use of Emergency would qualify as a search unless we know
how a search is defined. Part II of this Note will examine the tests that have
developed over the years, namely the Katz test and the Jones test, which give
the prevailing framework for determining whether a search has taken place.
Part III will show how these tests have been adapted and made applicable to
modern technology in our digital age. Technology has presented courts with
a variety of legal issues to sort through and, though the question of
Emergency use has not been settled at a circuit court level, related issues have
already found their way into appellate jurisdiction. In Part IV, this Note will
give a summation of what have come to be called the “MagStripe” cases, and
will show how the legal questions at issue in those cases could come to bear
heavily on the fate of Emergency use in future prosecutions. To conclude,
Part V will address how the culmination of the case law indicates that police
use of Emergency is not a search under the Fourth Amendment.
I.

FOURTH AMENDMENT ORIGINS

An analysis of whether a police officer’s use of the Emergency
function on a smartphone constitutes a search cannot be undertaken without
first obtaining an understanding of why the Constitution protects against
searches, and what kind of rights and interests are included under this
protection.
The Constitution provides, “The right of the people to be secure in
their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and
seizures, shall not be violated.”9 The origins of the Fourth Amendment “grew
directly out of the events which immediately preceded the revolutionary
struggle with England.”10 King Henry VIII had combined the government’s
power to search along with a licensing system to constrain the freedom of the
press in England.11 This arose from the publication of articles “attacking not
only governmental policies but the King himself.”12 It was not until later in
the 1600’s that the English people began adopting the belief that “the public
9. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
10. WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH
AMENDMENT § 1.1(a) (5th ed. Supp. 2016).
11. Id.
12. Meghan Totten, Constitution of the United States of America: Analysis, and
Interpretation – Centennial Edition, UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE,
1377-78 (June 27, 2016), https://www.congress.gov/content/conan/pdf/GPO-CONAN-REV2016.pdf.
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had a right to be safeguarded” from this kind of activity.13 Professor LaFave14
notes the words of William Pitt which summarize the heart of this movement:
The poorest man may, in his cottage, bid defiance to all the
force of the Crown. It may be frail; its roof may shake; the
wind may blow through it; the storm may enter; the rain may
enter; but the King of England may not enter; all his force
dares not cross the threshold of the ruined tenement.15
For colonials in particular, the Fourth Amendment represented
“protection against the use of the ‘writs of assistance.’”16 These writs were
issued by the Crown allowing officers to enter a premises and search for
goods that may have been smuggled into the colonies.17 Opposition to the
writs was led by James Otis, whose unsuccessful attempts to defeat the writs
paved the way for James Madison, who proposed that a clause nearly
identical to the finalized Fourth Amendment be included in the
Constitution.18
Now that we have a background for why the Fourth Amendment was
enacted, what exactly was it meant to protect against? Simply put, it is a
barrier, a hurdle that must be overcome before a government actor may
intrude upon certain enumerated areas of individual privacy—the
aforementioned “persons, houses, papers, and effects.”19 Generally speaking,
that is going to include your smartphone, and more importantly, the data
contained within your smartphone.
What kind of hurdle is created? Courts have held that “the ultimate
touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is ‘reasonableness.’”20 More
specifically, within the context of a search, “reasonableness” is typically
going to require obtaining a warrant.21 Warrants naturally slow down an
officer’s investigative process, but that is a price the judicial system is willing
to pay in order to uphold the privacy interests recognized in the Constitution.
The value of a warrant is its insertion of “the judgment of an independent
magistrate between law enforcement officers and the privacy of citizens.”22
Unlike early seventeenth-century England, the Constitution places such
importance on the individual right to privacy (though the extent is yet to be
13. LaFave, supra note 10, § 1.1(a) (quoting Nelson B. Lasson, The History and
Development of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, 38-39 (1937)).
14. Professor Wayne LaFave is the author of the treatise Search and Seizure, and is a
noted scholar on the Fourth Amendment.
15. Id. (quoting Nelson B. Lasson, The History and Development of the Fourth
Amendment to the United States Constitution, 49-50 (1937)).
16. Totten, supra note 12, at 1378.
17. Id.
18. LaFave, supra note 10, § 1.1(a).
19. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
20. Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 403 (2006).
21. Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2482 (2014).
22. Totten, supra note 12 at 1399.
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fully determined) that it is willing to impede public investigation, and
consequently the search for truth, in an aim to uphold that privacy.
There are, however, circumstances in which our justice system has
determined that the warrant requirement can be circumvented. A balancing
test is applied in which courts “determine whether to exempt a given type of
search from the warrant requirement ‘by assessing, on the one hand, the
degree to which it intrudes upon an individual’s privacy and, on the other,
the degree to which it is needed for the promotion of legitimate governmental
interests.’”23 Examples of legitimate governmental interests include officer
safety and avoiding the loss or destruction of evidence.24 To the extent there
is a threat to officer safety or evidence, the warrant requirement is less likely
to be waived.
The Fourth Amendment was enacted to protect the privacy of
individuals and their possessions. This protection extends to smartphones and
the data contained therein. And the protection is triggered any time a
government actor conducts a search of that smartphone. In our hypothetical
situation in which an officer uses the Emergency function of a suspect’s
smartphone without a warrant, three of the main requirements for a Fourth
Amendment violation are clearly met. We have a government actor (police
officer) and a protected piece of personal property (a smartphone).
Furthermore, no warrant has been obtained by the government actor. The
only remaining question is whether there has been a search. How do we know
when a search has been conducted?
II.

DEFINING A “SEARCH”

This section will summarize how courts have come to define a search
for purposes of the Fourth Amendment. Traditionally, searches were heavily
tied to physical trespass theory, but modern courts have adopted a more
expansive view. Two cases in particular establish the framework under which
a particular government action must be scrutinized to determine if there has
been a search—Katz v. United States25 and United States v. Jones26. Katz was
decided in 1967, and there have been many cases since then that apply and
interpret its holding and test. Jones, on the other hand, was decided in 2012,
and the extent of its impact remains to be seen.
A search is broadly defined as “an infringement of an expectation of
privacy that society is prepared to consider reasonable.”27 A search can take
many different forms, but it will typically involve some exertion of force,
whether large or small.28 It includes “some exploratory investigation, . . . a
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.

Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2484.
Id. at 2485.
See 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
See 565 U.S. 400 (2012).
79 C.J.S. Searches § 6 (2016). See also Katz 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
LaFave, supra note 10, § 2.1(a).
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looking for or seeking out.”29 In contrast, “a truly cursory inspection—one
that involves merely looking at what is already exposed to view, without
disturbing it—is not a ‘search’ for Fourth Amendment purposes.”30
Additionally, because the Fourth Amendment protection “extends to
governmental action only,” courts have held that “once an individual’s
expectation of privacy in particular information has been frustrated by a
private individual, the Fourth Amendment does not prohibit law
enforcement’s subsequent use of that information, even if obtained without a
warrant.”31
A.

Katz v. United States

The first of the tests that is applied to determine whether a particular
police action constitutes a search is the Katz test. Prior to Katz, a lack of
physical penetration into someone’s privacy was dispositive in determining
that a search had not taken place.32 However, courts began to take the view
that “the Fourth Amendment protects people, not places,” and therefore a
search could potentially take place without physical intrusion.33
In Katz, the defendant was charged with conducting an interstate
gambling business via telephone.34 He was apprehended when FBI agents
“attached an electronic listening and recording device to the outside of the
public telephone booth from which he had placed his calls.”35 The lower
courts ruled that there was no search, because the agents had not physically
intruded upon the phone booth.36
The United States Supreme Court reversed, saying, “once it is
recognized that the Fourth Amendment protects people—and not simply
‘areas’—against unreasonable searches and seizures it becomes clear that the
reach of that Amendment cannot turn upon the presence or absence of a
physical intrusion into any given enclosure.”37 The court went further by
saying, “[w]hat a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own
home or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection. But what

29. Id.
30. Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 328 (1987) (holding that “the distinction between
‘looking’ at a suspicious object in plain view and ‘moving it even a few inches’ is much
more than trivial for purposes of the Fourth Amendment”).
31. United States v. Sparks, 806 F.3d 1323, 1334 (11th Cir. 2015) (holding that the
unwarranted search of a cell phone did not violate Fourth Amendment protections because
the phone was found, unlocked, at a Walmart, and the police search of the phone did not
extend beyond that conducted by private citizens who found the phone).
32. Katz, 389 U.S. at 352.
33. Id. at 351.
34. Id. at 348.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 348-49.
37. Id. at 353.
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he seeks to preserve as private, even in an area accessible to the public, may
be constitutionally protected.”38
It is from this principle that Justice Harlan, in his concurrence,
iterated what has come to be known as the Katz test. Harlan’s concurrence is
notable because “lower courts attempting to interpret and apply Katz quickly
came to rely upon the Harlan elaboration, as ultimately did a majority of the
Supreme Court.”39 Harlan noted that “there is a twofold requirement, first
that a person have exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy and,
second, that the expectation be one that society is prepared to recognize as
‘reasonable.’”40
The first prong of the test is somewhat problematic to enforce, as the
Court takes the opportunity to dispose of previous standards without giving
much substance to what the new standard actually is.41 It has been noted that
the requirement of an actual expectation of privacy in the first prong opens
the requirement up to being manipulated.42 “[T]he government could
diminish each person’s subjective expectation of privacy merely by
announcing half-hourly on television that . . . we were all forthwith being
placed under comprehensive electronic surveillance.”43 As such, courts have
warned that the first prong of the Katz test can provide an “inadequate index
of Fourth Amendment protection.”44 Justice Harlan was satisfied that the
defendant in Katz had fulfilled this part of the test by closing the door of the
telephone booth.45 This simple action “entitled [Katz] to assume that his
conversation is not being intercepted.”46
The second prong is more objective because it takes into
consideration the concerns of society as a whole. Professor LaFave believes
that the “reasonableness” requirement embedded in the second prong was
Justice Harlan’s attempt at “giv[ing] content to the word ‘justifiably’ in the
majority’s assertion that eavesdropping on Katz was a search because it
‘violated the privacy upon which he justifiably relied while using the
telephone booth.’”47 How do we determine what is justifiable?
Reasonableness is not enough—”it must be based on something in addition
to a high probability of freedom from intrusion.”48 Justice Harlan would have
us conduct a balancing test weighing the individual’s “sense of security” and

38. Id. at 351 (internal citations omitted).
39. LaFave, supra note 10, § 2.1(b).
40. Katz, 389 U.S. at 361.
41. LaFave, supra note 10, § 2.1(b).
42. Id. § 2.1(c).
43. Anthony G. Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L.
REV. 349, 384 (1973-1974).
44. LaFave, supra note 10, § 2.1(c).
45. Katz, 389 U.S. at 361.
46. Id.
47. LaFave, supra note 10, § 2.1(d).
48. Id. (quoting From Private Places to Personal Privacy: A Post Katz Study of
Fourth Amendment Protection, 43. N.Y.U. L. REV. 968, 983 (1968)).
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the necessity of the conduct as a means of efficient law enforcement.49 Yet
again, we are asked to take a step back and view this from a societal
perspective. To what extent is society prepared to give up its rights to privacy
to facilitate efficient investigation of a crime?
The Katz test’s expansive view of Fourth Amendment protection has
been applied in many circumstances since its inception. For example, in
Minnesota v. Olson, it was determined that a defendant had a reasonable
expectation of privacy in a home which was not his, but in which he was
staying overnight.50 The Supreme Court took the very practical view that,
“[an overnight guest] seeks shelter in another’s home precisely because it
provides him with privacy, a place where he and his possessions will not be
disturbed by anyone but his host and those his host allows inside.”51 In further
support of a reasonable expectation, the Court acknowledged that “[w]e are
at our most vulnerable when we are asleep because we cannot monitor our
own safety or the security of our belongings.”52 The Court was unconcerned
with the fact that the defendant had no legal interest in the actual dwelling.53
Other Supreme Court justices have come to similar conclusions. In
Rakas v. Illinois, the Court held “that a person can have a legally sufficient
interest in a place other than his own home so that the Fourth Amendment
protects him from unreasonable governmental intrusion into that place.”54
Cases like this show just how expansive the applications of Katz have been,
and how ready courts are to find a privacy interest.
Regardless of the practical implementations of the Katz test, its
general effect is viewed as one of expanding Fourth Amendment protection.55
No longer must there be a physical intrusion by police officers in order for
someone’s Fourth Amendment rights to be violated.
B.

United States. v. Jones

Katz asked the question: Is a physical intrusion required for there to
be a search? The answer was a resounding “no.” United States v. Jones came
along over forty years later and asked: Is physical intrusion sufficient?56
In Jones, Antoine Jones was suspected of dealing drugs, and
government agents undertook various means of surveilling him.57 Among
those methods was the installation of a GPS tracking device on the underside
of Jones’ Jeep while it was parked in a public area.58 The device relayed
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.

Id. (quoting United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745 (1971)).
Minnesota v. Olson, 495 U.S. 91, 96-97 (1990).
Id. at 99.
Id.
Id.
Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 142 (1978).
Amsterdam, supra note 43, at 385.
See Jones, 565 U.S. at 400.
Id. at 402.
Id. at 403.
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information about Jones’ movement to officers, who compiled this
information with other evidence in formulating charges against Jones of
conspiracy to distribute and possession with intent to distribute cocaine.59 At
the trial court level, the judge excluded evidence obtained from the GPS unit
while it was parked at Jones’ home, but admitted evidence obtained while
Jones was travelling in public places.60 The judge relied on the Katz holding
by finding, “‘[a] person traveling in an automobile on public thoroughfares
has no reasonable expectation of privacy in his movements from one place
to another.’”61
After a reversal of the conviction by the Court of Appeals, the
Supreme Court upheld the reversal on the grounds that the attachment of the
GPS device to Jones’ car constituted a search, and was therefore a violation
of Jones’ Fourth Amendment rights.62 Justice Scalia expressed his
understanding of the facts in the most simplified way possible: “The
Government physically occupied private property for the purpose of
obtaining information.”63 Leaning on the origin of the Bill of Rights, he went
on to say, “[w]e have no doubt that such a physical intrusion would have been
considered a ‘search’ within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment when it
was adopted.”64
Using a textualist approach, Justice Scalia emphasized that the
Fourth Amendment has always been closely connected to property and the
pre-Katz search standards which revolved around trespass theory.65 While
not overruling Katz, he pointed out that “the Katz reasonable-expectation-ofprivacy test has been added to, not substituted for, the common-law
trespassory test.”66 He then clearly delineated, “we do not make trespass the
exclusive test. Situations involving merely the transmission of electronic
signals without trespass would remain subject to Katz analysis.”67 In a world
in which so much of our lives involve the “transmission of electronic
signals,” it is not hard to imagine that many situations will involve both the
Jones and the Katz analysis.
In order to qualify as a non-search, a government action must be able
to pass both the Katz and Jones tests. Either test alone is sufficient to
implicate an action as a search. These tests are fairly intuitive when applied
to traditional concepts and physical items. But how have these tests
(primarily Katz) adapted throughout the years of increased technological
complexity and the vast, intangible, digital world that now comprises the
majority of people’s lives?
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.

Id.
Id.
Id. (quoting United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 281 (1983)).
Id. at 404.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 409 (emphasis in original).
Id. at 411.
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FOURTH AMENDMENT AND CELL PHONES (GENERALLY)

This section will explore how courts have chosen to approach the
application of tests, at least in regard to Katz, which were developed in an
age with very little digital consideration, to the highly digital world in which
we live today. The Supreme Court’s decision in Riley v. California
exemplifies the current judicial attitude towards digital items which, in the
days of Katz, had physical counterparts.68
The Katz test has been constantly reexamined as new technologies
provide complex considerations regarding privacy rights of individuals. Prior
to the advent of smartphone technology, there was only so much private
information that a person could carry around with them. Chief Justice
Roberts has noted, “[m]ost people cannot lug around every piece of mail they
have received for the past several months, every picture they have taken, or
every book or article they have read—nor would they have any reason to
attempt to do so.”69 However, modern cell phones, or “minicomputers,” as
Justice Roberts aptly refers to them, are fully capable of doing just that.70 In
Riley, the Supreme Court demonstrated the judiciary’s heightened scrutiny
of searches involving smartphones and similar electronic devices.71
Riley itself is a combination of two appeals, the first brought by
David Riley appealing a warrantless search of his smartphone “looking for
evidence, because . . . gang members will often video themselves with guns
or take pictures of themselves with guns.”72 The search produced evidence
which linked Riley to a car used in a previous shooting incident.73 The second
case involved an appeal by Brima Wurie of police use of a “flip phone,” again
without a warrant, to locate his apartment, wherein they found “crack
cocaine, marijuana, drug paraphernalia, a firearm and ammunition, and
cash.”74
The Court began its analysis by distinguishing cases which had laid
the previous groundwork for when a warrant was required for a search
incident to an arrest. Chimel v. California established two central interests
that weigh in favor of circumventing the warrant requirement: officer safety
and the preservation of evidence.75 The Chimel analysis was applied in
United States v. Robinson where Robinson was being pat down when an

68. Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2473.
69. Id. at 2489.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 2473.
72. Id. at 2480-81.
73. Id. at 2481.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 2483 (citing Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969) (holding that it is
reasonable for an officer “to search the person arrested in order to remove any weapons that
the latter might seek to use,” and “search for and seize any evidence on the arrestee’s person
in order to prevent its concealment or destruction”)).
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officer felt something in his coat pocket.76 The item turned out to be a
“crumpled cigarette package,” and the officer proceeded to open it, finding
capsules of heroin.77 The Robinson Court held this search unreasonable
because it did not implicate either of the Chimel factors—”Robinson was
unlikely to have evidence of the crime of arrest on his person,” and “it could
not be justified as part of a protective search for weapons.”78
But the Court refused to apply the Robinson and Chimel reasoning
to searches regarding cell phones.79 Cell phones are a different animal.
Searches of cell phones do not present comparable risks as those searches
considered by Robinson and Chimel—“a search of the information on a cell
phone bears little resemblance to the type of brief physical search considered
in Robinson.”80
In the Riley decision, Justice Roberts paints the picture of a person
carting around a trunk filled with all of the personal items they had collected
over the past several years.81 Cell phones represent not just the ability to carry
around this extreme volume of information, but because of the “many distinct
types of information—an address, a note, a prescription, a bank statement, a
video—that reveal much more in combination than any isolated record,” cell
phones could essentially allow for “[t]he sum of an individual’s private life
to be reconstructed.”82
There are other aspects of a cell phone search which troubled the
Court. Particularly, the Court was disturbed by the pervasiveness present in
a cell phone search as opposed to a physical search. Whereas, in the past, a
“police officer searching an arrestee might have occasionally stumbled
across a highly personal item such as a diary,” in today’s society, “it is no
exaggeration to say that many of the more than 90% of American adults who
own a cell phone keep on their person a digital record of nearly every aspect
of their lives—from the mundane to the intimate.”83 In particular, the
information exposed could include a “wealth of detail about her familial,
political, professional, religious, and sexual associations.”84
Clearly, the Court was greatly concerned about both the quantity and
quality of the information which could be exposed by a cell phone search.
The concern for this type of information is not new, as Justice Roberts noted
the Learned Hand quote from 1926, “that it is ‘a totally different thing to
search a man’s pockets and use against him what they contain, from

76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.

Id. at 2483 (citing United States v. Robinson, 414, U.S. 218 (1973)).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 2485.
Id.
Id. at 2489.
Id.
Id. at 2490.
Id. (quoting Jones, 565 U.S. at 415 (Sotomayor, J., concurring)).
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ransacking his house for everything which may incriminate him.’”85 Smart
phones and their progeny have simply made this information much more
accessible to anyone who possesses them. Riley made clear that the
accessibility of that information does not make it any less sacrosanct—“[t]he
fact that technology now allows an individual to carry such information in
his hand does not make the information any less worthy of the protection for
which the Founders fought.”86
Courts will clearly look beyond the label of “phone.” Smartphones
will be treated similarly to computers or any other storage device capable of
containing the intimate details of an individual’s life. How does this bear on
the issue of Emergency functionality? To address that particular question, we
must turn to more nuanced case law. Simply possessing someone’s phone is
not the same as diving through the minutia of their calendar, email, and web
browsing history. Just as the Court in Riley was concerned about the quantity
and quality of information potentially exposed by a search, there must surely
exist a spectrum of discoverable information. At some point along this
spectrum the quantity of the information exposed is so great, or the quality
of the information exposed so private, that courts will find a search has taken
place.
IV.

THE MAGSTRIPE CASES

Where, on the spectrum, does the information at stake in our
hypothetical case lie? What is the quality and quantity of information
exposed when an officer utilizes Emergency? As will be discussed later in
this section, though Professor Kerr87 and I disagree as to the holdings of the
cases, we agree that the facts of the Emergency case align closely with the
fact patterns of a group of cases currently being litigated through the circuit
courts—the Magstripe Cases.
The question at issue is whether there is a reasonable expectation of
privacy in the magnetic stripe (magstripe) of a credit card. Typically, the
information contained in the magstripe is reflective of what is printed on the
front of the card, i.e. name, account number, and expiration date.88 However,
that information is capable of being reprogrammed to contain anything—
subject to a limit of 79 letters and 147 numbers.89 This is particularly useful
to criminals who purchase stolen credit card data, but are not in possession
85. Id. at 2490-91 (quoting United States v. Kirschenblatt, 16 F.2d 202, 203 (2nd Cir.
1926)).
86. Id. at 2495.
87. Orin Kerr is a professor at George Washington University Law School, and is a
scholar of criminal procedure and computer crime law.
88. Orin Kerr, Is Credit Card Skimming a Fourth Amendment Search?, WASHINGTON
POST (July 29, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp
/2015/07/29/is-credit-card-skimming-a-fourth-amendment-search/?tid=a_inl&utm_term=.
d4cd92ee9c05.
89. Id.
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of the actual cards.90 As Professor Kerr points out, “the buyer can take an old
credit card and re-encode the old card with information from the stolen credit
card number. The buyer can then use the old credit card as if it were the stolen
card.”91
Law enforcement, upon lawfully retrieving what they believe to be
stolen credit cards, can skim the information from the magstripe to see if it
matches the information on the front of the card.92 If it does not match, they
are alerted to some kind of fraud.93 But, is the skimming of the credit card
information a Fourth Amendment search? The Fifth, Sixth, and Eighth
Circuits have all weighed in on the issue and, though the three have come to
similar conclusions, there is some speculation that a circuit split is in the
making.94
A.

United States v. Bah

The Sixth Circuit was the first to address this issue in United States
v. Bah.95 Mamadou Bah and Allan Harvey were stopped by a police officer
for speeding in a construction zone.96 A lawful search of their vehicle and
their persons turned up eighty-six cards; including credit, debit, and gift
cards.97 The officer, “without a warrant—then used a magnetic card reader,
or “skimmer,” to read the information encoded on the magnetic strips of
[some of the cards].”98 As expected, “a ‘majority, if not all’ of the magstripes
had been re-encoded so that the financial information they contained did not
match the information printed on the front and backs of the cards.”99
Subsequent investigation showed that several of the accounts linked to the
cards “had already incurred fraudulent charges.”100
The trial court ruled that the evidence from the magstripes should not
be excluded because “‘[a]n owner or possessor of a credit, debit, or gift card
has no reasonable expectation of privacy in the data encoded on the magnetic
strip.’”101 The circuit court upheld the lower court’s holding regarding the
magstripes, and it expounded with its own reasoning.102 Broadly, the circuit
court held that “[n]o ‘search’ occurred when law enforcement read the
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Orin Kerr (@OrinKerr), TWITTER (Oct. 14, 2016, 1:15 PM), https://twitter.com/
OrinKerr/status/787024088304721920.
95. 794 F.3d 617 (2015).
96. Id. at 621.
97. Id. at 622-23.
98. Id. at 623.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 624.
101. Id. at 625 (quoting magistrate’s decision, U.S. v. Bah, No. 2:13-CR-48, 2013 WL
5652647, at *7 (E.D. Tenn. Aug. 8, 2013)).
102. Id. at 630.
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magnetic strips on the backs of the fraudulent cards because: (1) the scans
did not involve a physical intrusion of a constitutionally protected area—as
required under the trespass-based search analysis; and (2) the scans did not
violate the cardholders’ reasonable expectation of privacy.”103
Regarding the physical intrusion aspect, the court examined the
decisions of Jones and Florida v. Jardines, both of which involved the
government “physically intruding into an area.”104 This situation was distinct
from those because “‘[s]liding a card through a scanner to read virtual data .
. . does not involve’ any such physical invasions.”105
In applying the Katz test, the court disregarded the argument of
whether the men had a subjective expectation of privacy in the magstripes.106
That issue was irrelevant because, as the court determined, “neither Bah nor
Harvey [held] a reasonable expectation of privacy in the magnetic strips. . . .
Such an expectation of privacy is not one that society is prepared to consider
is reasonable.”107 The court was unwilling to recognize a reasonable privacy
interest in the magnetic strips because they are “routinely read by private
parties at gas stations, restaurants, and grocery stores to accelerate financial
transactions.”108 The information on the strips, specifically the account
number, “is routinely shared with cashiers every time the card is used.” 109
The court noted that “‘society is not prepared to accept as legitimate an
asserted privacy interest in information that any member of the public may
see.’”110
Moreover, the court was not persuaded by the amount and kind of
information that would potentially be exposed by such an action.111 It
distinguished the Supreme Court’s ruling in Riley, regarding searches of cell
phones, computers, and cassettes, on the basis that concerns regarding the
quantity and quality of information exposed by those searches were not at
issue here.112 Specifically, the court said “[t]he storage capacity of the
magnetic strip of credit, debit, or gift card pales in comparison to that of a
computer hard drive, cell phone, or even audiocassette,” “a reading of it . . .
would not allow officers to reconstruct an individual’s private life,” and “[it]
is not the highly personal information an individual would expect to keep
private.”113 Furthermore, the information in the credit card “is intended to be
read by third parties,” and “literally has no purpose other than to be provided
103. Id.
104. Id. (citing Jones, 565 U.S. 400 (2012); Florida v. Jardines 133 S. Ct. 1409 (2013)).
105. Id. (quoting United States v. Alabi, 943 F. Supp. 2d 1201 (D.N.M. 2013)).
106. Id. at 630.
107. Id. at 630-631.
108. Id. at 631.
109. Id.
110. Id. (quoting United States v. DE L’Isle, No. 4:14-CR-3089, 2014 WL 5431349, at
* 7 (D. Neb. Oct. 24, 2014)).
111. Id. at 632.
112. Id. at 633.
113. Id.
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to others to facilitate financial transactions.”114 It was important to the court
that the extent of the information to be exposed was known, and they
withheld judgment regarding situations where either the contents of the
device were truly unknown or where future storage capacity allowed for a
much greater amount of private information to be stored on these kinds of
cards.115
B.

United States v. DE L’Isle

The case of United States v. DE L’Isle has many similarities to
Bah.116 Just as in Bah, Eric-Arnaud Benjamin Briere DE L’Isle was pulled
over for a routine traffic stop—following too closely to a semi-tractor
trailer.117 The police officer smelled marijuana and lawfully obtained fiftynine credit, debit, and gift cards during his subsequent search of the
vehicle.118 “DE L’Isle was charged with possession of fifteen or more
counterfeit and unauthorized access devices,” and he moved to suppress the
evidence gained from the skimming of the cards.119 DE L’Isle argued that the
account information contained in the strip was the “type of information that
the Supreme Court would consider a legitimate privacy interest.”120
The discussion by the court was also similar to Bah; there was no
physical intrusion into the card to offend the Jones test.121 In this case,
however, the court addressed the issue of whether the defendant could have
had a subjective expectation of privacy in the cards. The answer was ‘no’
because, “the purpose of a credit, debit, or gift card is to enable the holder of
the card to make purchases, and to accomplish this, the holder must transfer
information from the card to the seller, which negates an expressed privacy
interest.”122 Similarly to Bah, this Court found that DE L’Isle had no
expectation of privacy in the cards that society was prepared to accept as
reasonable.123
What sets DE L’Isle apart from Bah is the argument presented by the
dissenting Judge Kelly in DE L’Isle.124 The dissent sought to remand the case
in order to gather more information, but also took a starkly different approach
to the expectation of privacy issues from the majority.125

114. Id. (quoting DE L’Isle, No. 4:14-CR-3089, 2014 WL 5431349 (D. Neb. Oct. 24,
2014)).
115. Id. at 633.
116. DE L’Isle, 825 F.3d 426 (8th Cir. 2016).
117. Id. at 429.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 431.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 432.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 433.
125. Id. at 434.
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Judge Kelly’s main concern was the ease with which one could rewrite the information contained on a magstripe.126 She invoked the
“straightforward principle that law enforcement conducts a Fourth
Amendment ‘search’ when it reads the contents of rewritable digital storage
media.”127 Under Judge Kelly’s theory, to the extent that the magstripes are
easily rewritable, they should be treated more like digital storage devices or
mini-hard drives.128 “If a magnetic stripe card is a digital storage device,
albeit one whose storage capacity is limited, . . . reading the data on it is a
Fourth Amendment search.”129 She goes on to give examples of legal
applications of the rewritable functionality; a cardholder could “rewrite the
data on the magnetic stripe of a card she had no more use for to
‘MYBANKACCOUNTPASSWORDIS78911Y783,’ so that she could
recover her password in the event she forgot it.”130
Her point is that police officers cannot know for sure what they are
going to find when they skim the magstripe. It might be illegal, but it might
not be. It could in fact be the kind of personal information that the Fourth
Amendment was intended to protect. She goes further to say that,
“individuals have a reasonable expectation of privacy even in so-called
single-purpose containers, ‘those rare containers’ whose ‘distinctive
configuration . . . proclaims [their] content.’”131 Examples include things like
“cereal boxes, guitar bags, gun cases, and the like.”132 In other words, it
doesn’t matter if officers know what they are going to find in the container—
i.e., cereal—and that the possible exposure of information is limited. “The
Fourth Amendment provides protection to the owner of every container that
conceals its contents from plain view.”133
Judge Kelly is not the only opponent of the judicial trend which
proclaims no expectation of privacy in magstripes. Professor Orin Kerr has
been very vocal in his belief that a reasonable expectation of privacy exists
in the information encoded on a magstripe.134 In his opinion, swiping the
magstripe “is a classic kind of Fourth Amendment search, retrieving
information stored inside a storage device.”135 He sees it as irrelevant that the
information typically matches what is on the outside of the card.136 Instead,
he emphasizes one of the same points made by Judge Kelly—ultimately,
police officers do not know what information they are going to find when

126. Id.
127. Id. (citing United States v. James, 353 F.3d 606, 613 (8th Cir. 2003)).
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 435.
131. Id. at 436.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 435 (quoting United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 822-23 (1982)).
134. Kerr, supra note 88.
135. Id.
136. Id.
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they swipe the card.137 Judge Kelly was particularly troubled by this point, as
she said, “the results of a search cannot be used to justify its legality.”138 She
continued, “[w]e have had frequent occasion to point out that a search is not
to be made legal by what it turns up. In law it is good or bad when it starts
and does not change character from its success.”139 As an example, she
supplied that whether full of contraband or legitimate papers, once an officer
opens a briefcase, a search has been conducted.140
Professor Kerr continues on to examine the argument made by the
majority in DE L’Isle, that there is no expectation of privacy because the card
number is handed out every time the card is used.141 In his opinion, the
situation is no different than if he is “working on a blog post from [his] laptop
at home,” and the police want to hack into his laptop based solely on the fact
that he “plan[s] to publish the post eventually.”142 In other words, whether
information has been given out in the past, or would be given out in the
future, does not defeat Fourth Amendment protection of that information at
the present moment.143
Following the Fifth Circuit’s holding that there is no reasonable
expectation of privacy in a magstripe, Professor Kerr again sought to clarify
two points of his argument.144 First, he argues that the decisions resting on
the amount of information exposed are mistaken in their reasoning.145 He
cites Arizona v. Hicks to show that the amount of information potentially
exposed by the act should not be determinative. In Hicks, “[t]he officer’s act
was not likely to reveal a lot of information, and the only information was
the manufacturer’s information about the serial number.”146 Even here, where
the exposure of information would be minimal, “the Court ruled that moving
the turntable was a search.”147 Professor Kerr also uses this example to refute
the argument regarding quality or type of information.148 In Hicks, the
information at stake was a serial number—“just meaningless numbers
assigned by a company that most users don’t know about and would never
care to see.”149 In this respect, the information in Hicks contained even less

137. Id.
138. DE L’Isle, 825 F.3d at 435.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. See id. at 432.
142. Kerr, supra note 88.
143. Id.
144. Orin Kerr, Fifth Circuit Rules on Whether Scanning the Magnetic Stripe on a Card
is a Search, WASHINGTON POST (Oct. 16, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/
volokh-conspiracy/wp/2016/10/16/fifth-circuit-rules-on-whether-scanning-magnetic-stripeon-a-card-is-a-search/?utm_term=.53088802447c.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Id.

328

BELMONT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 5: 311

personal information than that which is at stake in the magstripe cases.150 His
conclusion is that “like moving the turntable in Hicks, . . . scanning the
magnetic stripe on the back of a card ‘expose[s] to view concealed portions
of the [item] or its contents’ and is therefore a search.”151
Professor Kerr’s second argument is that courts have misplaced their
focus in these cases.152 In his opinion, rather than concerning themselves with
the nature of the information obtained, they should be looking at the method
used to obtain it—“forcibly exposing information from inside a person’s
Fourth Amendment effects, which is as core of a search as you can get.”153
His opinion is that the courts should be sticking to a bright-line rule in these
situations—one that disregards how minimal the information accessed might
be.154
Whether on the side of the majority opinions in these cases, or on the
side with Judge Kelly and Professor Kerr, it is clear that although there is not
yet a circuit split, intelligent minds disagree regarding the privacy
implications of these facts. Because of the factual similarities between the
magstripe cases and the Emergency hypothetical case, whichever view is
adopted in the magstripe cases will be highly indicative of how the
Emergency case is decided.
V.

ANALYSIS AND APPLICATION

As of the writing of this Note, only one case has directly addressed
the issue in question here. In State v. Hill, a Georgia police officer used a
phone left in the back seat of a taxi cab to place a call out to 911.155 By doing
so, he obtained the identifying information of the phone owner, Hill, who
was subsequently charged with theft of services for fleeing the cab without
paying his fare.156 This was done through the Emergency feature, and the
passcode protected information on the phone was not accessed.157 Though
the reasoning of that court differs from what has been set forth here, the
conclusion is the same—the information obtained was not entitled to
protection under the Fourth Amendment. The arguments made by that court
are incorporated into this section.
In line with the majority decision from DE L’Isle and the holding in
Bah, courts should find that there is no reasonable expectation of privacy in
a phone number, such that a police officer’s use of the Emergency
functionality of the phone to retrieve the number should not be considered a
Fourth Amendment search for three reasons: (1) the quality and quantity of
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. 338 Ga. App. 57 (Ga. Ct. App. 2016).
156. Id.
157. Id.
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the information exposed does not trigger Fourth Amendment protection, (2)
it qualifies as a non-search under both the Jones test and (3) the Katz test.
Moreover, even if a court were to find this action to be a search, it is possible
that the warrant requirement would be waived through an application of the
balancing test (weighing “the degree to which it intrudes upon an individual’s
privacy and . . . the degree to which it is needed for the promotion of
legitimate governmental interests”)158 or if it fell into one of the major
exceptions to the warrant requirement.
First, the quality and quantity of information accessed in this case do
not rise to the level of being protected by the Fourth Amendment search
requirements. It is important, before beginning the analysis, that
consideration be given not only to the nature of the information being
exposed, but also the manner in which it is being accessed. As stated
previously, the Emergency functionality of the phone is accessible from the
phone’s lock screen—without needing to enter or break the phone’s
passcode. This is important because the data stored on the phone is not
exposed to the person utilizing Emergency. The Emergency screen itself is a
number pad from which any telephone number can be dialed—it is not
restricted to dialing 911. None of the phone’s contacts are displayed. Under
the proposed scenario, the only information accessible by a police officer is
the telephone number associated with the cell phone. This would be achieved
by dialing 911—the telephone number of the phone would display to the 911
operator—and then the officer would communicate with the call center
operator to get the number of the phone.
It should be distinguished that the identity of the phone owner is not
exposed throughout this process, only the telephone number associated with
the phone. Should they choose to do so, police officers would be able,
through the warrant process, to access the owner’s identity from the
telephone service provider.
But even if the owner’s identity was among the information to be
exposed, the court in State v. Hill did not consider identifying information—
including things like phone number, name, and birthdate—to be among the
types of information protected by the Fourth Amendment.159 Particularly, the
court held “that [the defendant] had no legitimate expectation of privacy in
this information.”160 The court went on to cite over a dozen cases from
various jurisdictions indicating that this kind of information was not the kind
“about which a person can have a reasonable expectation of privacy.”161 This
categorical distinction of a class of identifying information which is not
entitled to Fourth Amendment protection is in line with the Katz “reasonable
expectation of privacy” test. However, this categorical exclusion is distinct
from Katz analysis because it was not included in the original Katz case, and
158. Totten, supra note 12, at 2484.
159. Hill, 338 Ga. App. at 58.
160. Id.
161. Id. at 59.
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has developed over time through various court decisions. Moreover, the court
refused to extend Riley reasoning to the identifying information “simply
because that information was associated with a cellular phone account rather
than a landline phone account or a piece of physical mail.”162
The Georgia Court of Appeals in Hill made a further distinction
regarding the protections provided by the Fourth Amendment. Namely, the
Court noted that, “although the content of personal communications is
private, the information necessary to get those communications from point A
to point B is not.”163 This is a significant point, and it stands in stark contrast
to the view taken by Professor Kerr. The Georgia court focused very heavily
on the quality of information that is being accessed, whereas Professor Kerr,
and those who believe similarly, are concerned more about the method
through which the information is obtained—“[c]alling 911 pushes out the
number from the phone, and [Kerr thinks] that forced revealing of the number
should count as a search of the phone.”164
The Hill majority’s counterpoint to Kerr is that it simply does not
matter that a police officer, rather than a private citizen, was the one doing
the ‘forcing.’165 The court stated explicitly that this distinction “does not
change our conclusion that the information was not subject to Fourth
Amendment protection.”166 It went on to cite case law permitting government
actors to take actions ranging from causing a cell phone to emit location
information to removing the phone’s battery in order to obtain the serial
number associated with the phone.167 In each of these cases, the reviewing
court held that no search had taken place.168
As an aside, also available in the Emergency screen is a Medical ID
function. The Medical ID screen may include name and birthdate of the
phone’s owner, emergency contacts, and medical allergy information, similar
to a medical ID bracelet or necklace. The Fourth Amendment implications of
this functionality lies beyond the scope of this Note, but it will suffice to say
that the information included in the Medical ID section is loaded voluntarily
by the owner for the sole purpose of being utilized by a third party for that
owner’s benefit.
How does the access to telephone number information square with
the different Fourth Amendment search tests? Under the Jones analysis,
assuming that the police are in lawful possession of the phone, accessing the
Emergency function likely does not offend common-law trespass theory.
162. Id. at 61.
163. Id. at 59.
164. Orin Kerr, Calling 911 From A Phone To Obtain Its Number Does Not ‘Search’ It,
Court Rules, WASHINGTON POST (July 15, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2016/07/15/calling-911-from-a-phone-to-obtain-its-numberdoes-not-search-it-court-rules/?tid=a_inl&utm_term=.c1626cce67cc.
165. Hill, 338 Ga. App. at 60.
166. Id.
167. Id. at 60-61.
168. Id.
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Looking strictly at the physical nature of the action, officers using their
fingers to swipe and touch a glass screen does not rise to the same level of
attaching a GPS monitoring device to someone’s car, as was the case in
Jones.169 It would be much more akin to, though still not the same as, the
officer’s actions in Hicks, where the officer moved stereo equipment in order
to retrieve serial numbers of what he suspected to be stolen goods.170 The
immediate hypothetical is distinguishable even from Hicks, in that Hicks still
involved a physical moving of items and uncovering of information which
the court determined was,
[A] “search” separate and apart from the search for the
shooter, victims, and weapons that was the lawful objective
of his entry into the apartment. Merely inspecting those parts
of the turntable that came into view during the latter search
would not have constituted an independent search, because
it would have produced no additional invasion of
respondent’s privacy interest.171
The violation committed by the officer in Hicks sounds in physical
trespass. His lawful search gave him access to the apartment, but it did not
give him the right to conduct “a ‘search’ separate and apart” from the lawful
one.172 Hicks, while pre-dating Jones, and not a part of the Jones analysis,
serves to show the high level of sensitivity with which trespass theory is
applied to Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.
Clearly, the physical trespass reasoning is insufficient when dealing
with modern technology. Many invasive searches can take place in today’s
world without the government physically intruding upon anything. So, how
does this action hold up under Katz analysis?
First, is there a subjective expectation of privacy in the information
accessed by Emergency? For the Katz court, it was enough to satisfy this test
simply that Katz had shut the door to the telephone booth.173 That which he
wanted to keep private was the sound of his words. Though he may have been
plainly visible in the booth to anyone passing by, the action of closing the
phone booth door indicated that he had a subjective expectation of privacy in
the things that he said. This portion of the test is difficult to apply outside of
a specific case, because the facts and people involved will most likely change
the analysis, but it is fair to analogize the phone booth door to the iPhone
lock screen. By creating a passcode and engaging the lock screen function,
the user of a phone has asserted that the information behind that screen is
private. By this analogy, anything in the phone which must be accessed by
169. Jones, 565 U.S. at 403.
170. Hicks, 480 U.S. at 323.
171. Id. at 324-325.
172. Id. at 324.
173. Katz, 389 U.S. at 361.
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inputting the passcode is entitled to a subjective expectation of privacy. But
the instant case involves information and functionality which exists outside
of that passcode barrier, and by that logic would not automatically be
presumed to have a subjective expectation of privacy.
Moreover, a user’s awareness of the Emergency function decreases
that person’s subjective expectation of privacy. As it has been pointed out
that the Government could “diminish each person’s expectation of privacy”
by letting us all know that we are subject to constant surveillance, to the
extent that an iPhone user is aware that his or her phone can be used to place
an Emergency call without unlocking the passcode, he or she has lost the
subjective expectation that it would not be used in this way. For these
reasons, the Emergency function of the phone sits “outside the phone booth”
and should not be afforded a subjective expectation of privacy.
One critique of this position is that the Emergency functionality on
the phone is not set up voluntarily by the phone’s owner. It is built into the
operations of the phone. Yes, the case against a subjective expectation would
be made much stronger if there were an opt-in or opt-out setting which each
user could utilize or ignore at his or her preference. However, though the
situation is not ideal, it is still fair to preclude smartphone users from
asserting a subjective expectation of privacy in the phone’s Emergency
functionality.
Even if a particular user could establish a subjective expectation of
privacy, Katz requires that it must be an expectation which “society is
prepared to recognize as ‘reasonable.’”174 It is here where all of the modern
computer, smartphone, and magstripe cases come into play. As Riley makes
clear, our society is prepared to recognize an expansive privacy interest in
smartphones for the simple reason that they are much more appropriately
considered computers—which also happen to make phone calls.175 The
information contained in smartphones touches nearly every aspect of a
person’s life and, from the criminal’s perspective, can implicate someone of
wrongdoing much faster and easier than a search of the most hidden spaces
of his house.
The critical point here is that this vast world of information contained
in a smartphone is not compromised by the use of the Emergency function.
It is unquestioned that an officer would need a warrant in order to penetrate
to the actual substance of the device wherein all of the applications, emails,
calendars, and messages are contained that implicate the deep privacy
interest.176 But that is not happening here. The only information to be exposed
by this search is a ten-digit number associated with the device. Justice
Roberts’ vision of a person carting around a trunk full of all of their personal
items is inapplicable to this limited use of the phone.

174. Id. at 352.
175. See Riley, 134 S. Ct. 2473.
176. See Id.
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Furthermore, Riley’s broad recognition of privacy is not without
limits. The Katz decision itself conceded that “[w]hat a person knowingly
exposes to the public, even in his own home or office, is not a subject of
Fourth Amendment protection.”177 The magstripe cases keyed in on this
reasoning in noting that a person has no privacy interest in the number
programmed into the card because, “the purpose of [a card] is to enable the
holder of the card to make purchases, and to accomplish this, the holder must
transfer information form the card to the seller, which negates an expressed
privacy interest.”178
The court in Hill incorporated this reasoning into its decision, and it
expounded, saying “[t]his rule applies even where the person revealing
information intended its use by the third party to be limited.”179 The
reasoning, according to the court is that, “[b]y using a phone, a person
exposes identifying information to third parties, such as telephone
companies, and assumes the risk that the telephone company may reveal that
information to the government.”180 On this very narrow point, I disagree with
the Hill majority. While I agree with the Court’s ultimate conclusion, its
application of an assumption of the risk principle goes too far, and has far
reaching privacy implications that the Court probably did not intend. The
mere consumption of a product or service should not then entitle the
providing company to disclose information about that consumption to the
government. So, while the assumption of the risk argument can contribute to
the analysis, it should not be alone sufficient to warrant government intrusion
into an individual’s private information.
The practical use of a telephone number bears great similarity to the
number encoded on a credit card stripe. The purpose of a telephone number
is to serve as a locator, allowing others to actively contact a phone’s user.
Anytime a user places a call, his or her number is automatically given out to
whoever the user is trying to contact—assuming the user is not utilizing an
identity-blocking service. In fact, it is exactly that kind of information which
someone “knowingly exposes to the public” every time they use their
phone.181
The force of the argument presented by Judge Kelly’s dissent in DE
L’Isle is lessened when applied to telephone numbers, because the number
associated with the phone is not manipulable in the same way that the number
encoded in a credit card magstripe is manipulable. Judge Kelly was
concerned by the similarities between the magstripe and a regular container,
in which someone, through the process of re-encoding, could be storing their

177. Katz, 389 U.S. at 351.
178. DE L’Isle, 825 F.3d at 432.
179. Hill, 338 Ga. App. at 60 (citing United States v. Graham, 824 F.3d 421, 425 (4th
Cir. 2016)).
180. Hill, 338 Ga. App. at 60.
181. See Katz, 389 U.S. at 351.
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password for an account or an admission of guilt to some crime.182 The
information gathered by police officers when they use the Emergency
function is nothing more than the ten-digit number associated with the phone.
Finally, even if a court were to find that a search had taken place, it
is possible that the warrant requirement would be waived. There are two main
ways in which this can happen: (1) through an application of a balancing test
which essentially weighs the individual’s privacy interest with legitimate
governmental interests, or (2) if the facts of the case happen to fall within one
of the recognized exceptions to the warrant requirement. Regarding the first
option, legitimate governmental interests commonly boil down to just two
considerations—officer safety and the destruction of evidence.183
Both of these possibilities involve heavily fact-based inquiries, and
the benefit of trying to apply them here is minimal. However, there are some
general observations that can be made regarding the interests of the balancing
test. As argued above, it can be said that the individual privacy interest at
stake is relatively small. As the court in Hill pointed out, many courts have
held that general identifying information is not the kind in which an
individual has a reasonable expectation of privacy.184 It can also be said that
the governmental interest is small, because it would be a rare circumstance
for this narrow use of Emergency to implicate officer safety or an avoidance
of the destruction of evidence.
There is certainly not a clear-cut answer as to whether or not use of
the Emergency function to retrieve a phone number would qualify as a
search, but I believe that after consideration of the qualitative and
quantitative factors of the information exposed, and an application of the
Katz and Jones tests, this kind of action is not a search, and therefore no
warrant should be required for police officers to make use of this tactic.
Furthermore, it is possible that the warrant requirement would be waived
even if this action was found to be a search.
CONCLUSION
The touchstone of Fourth Amendment applications begins and ends
with reasonableness. True, there are certain bright-line rules giving definition
to the concept of a search. But, barring a violation of those rules, judges must
take into consideration all of the factors involved and make a decision which
properly balances both the interests of individual privacy and the efficiency
of police investigation.
It is an oversimplification of the issue, and ignores the need for
expedient investigation, to simply say police should be required to get a
warrant in situations where the Emergency function is used. It is equally
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dangerous to expand police power to conduct unwarranted activities which
exist at the fringes of Fourth Amendment protection without justification.
In this case, however, there is ample justification to allow police to
utilize the Emergency feature of a smartphone without first obtaining a
warrant in order to ascertain the identity of its owner. The quantity of
information exposed is small; the information is limited to the ten digits
which make up the associated telephone number. The number is not easily
manipulable such that this portion of the device could be considered a
container—no passwords or messages written by the phone’s owner will be
discovered by the police officer’s call. Moreover, the quality of the
information is not the kind to which courts have applied Fourth Amendment
protection. As the Georgia court acknowledged in State v. Hill, basic
identifying information such as name, age, and phone number is not the kind
to which individuals are entitled a privacy interest.
Additionally, the way in which the information is retrieved does not
trigger Fourth Amendment protection. Previous cases have shown great
concern for intrusions upon the data contained within a phone (typically
protected by the phone’s passcode). In this case, the information gathered is
all outside of the passcode’s protection, and does not invoke Riley protection
because the “trunk” full of calendars, emails, communications, and internet
history is not exposed to the officer in any way.
Fourth Amendment protection is not implicated by an application of
the Jones test. There is no physical intrusion into the phone, rather, contact
with the phone is purely external in this situation.
Nor is protection required under an application of the Katz test. A
subjective expectation, though it may be able to be shown case to case, is
difficult to prove, and ultimately less determinative of the issue than the
objective requirement. From an objective standpoint, there are sufficient
reasons to hold that an expectation of privacy in this information is not
something which society is prepared to accept as reasonable. Among those
are the Hill majority’s analysis of the kind of information at issue, and the
fact that a telephone number is knowingly disclosed to third parties as a
normal function of its use.
For these reasons, police use of the Emergency function on a
smartphone should not be considered a search under the Fourth Amendment,
and therefore a warrant should not be required before a government actor is
able to make use of the function.

